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We can find transcendental argument in Aristole’s and Descartes’ works. 
However, it is first systematically used by Kant, and reintroduced by Strowson in 
1950s. Generally, it reveals (by way of questioning ‘How possible’)a priori relation 
between general conditions of experience and empirical propositions or affairs, such 
as relation between categories and experience(Transcendental Deduction), relation 
between general physical objects and experience of self-consciousness(Refutation of 
Idealism), and relation between conceptual scheme and public world consisted in 
spatio-temporal objects. Therefore, it has a basic form: There is Y, and X is a 
necessary condition of Y, so X must be the case. 
In this paper, I first introduce and comment about several well-known paradigms 
of transcendental argument before investigating transcendental argument itself. 
Therefore, this paper includes two parts: empirical study and critical study on 
transcendental arguments. The empirical study provides us with the most important 
reference. Without these cases, transcendental argument will only stay in the minds 
as a mere illusion, and will greatly reduce its theoretical value. We must learn 
different philosophical thinking, because all instances of transcendental argument 
have their own special philosophical thinking and principles respectively. It is one of 
many difficulties. Although there are obvious differences with various instances of 
transcendental argument, there are inherited relationship between them. 
Undoubtedly, Kant's transcendental argument is the prototype of all others: some are 
direct transformations of it (such as Strawson's objectivity argument) , some are 
directly influenced by it (such as Wittgenstein's private language argument, and 
Putnam's "brain in vat" argument), some are creative constructions which based on 
its principle (such as Davidson's omniscient interpreter argument). 
The second part is to answer three questions: Are transcendental arguments 















functions and goals do transcendental arguments have? By answering these 
questions, we can answer a general question: What is a transcendental argument? 
The first issue mainly relates to the uniqueness proof, which attempt to prove the 
uniqueness of categorical schema in order to establish the stable nature of schema, 
thus representing the value of transcendental argument. The second question mainly 
relates to a dilemma raised by Stroud: If a transcendental argument to successfully 
deal with skepticism about the external world, then it will either resort to 
verificationism, so it is redundant, or it can only show that we believe we have 
knowledge of external world, however, this makes the argument trivial. For these 
two standard line of objection, we can refute them from two levels: strategy level 
and principle level. We can analysis one by one the three ways of proof provided by 
Körner, pointing out the errors and providing a possible path at the strategic level; 
And at principle level, we can say that Körner misunderstands transcendental 
deduction, especially wrongly evaluates the relation between categorical scheme and 
transcendental deduction, so do not need to prove categorical scheme’s uniqueness. 
Similarly, I first point out that Stroud misunderstands Strawson’s argument in 
Individual , and secondly, we should rethink the relationship between transcendental 
argument and skepticism in principle, especially the relationship between Kant and 
Skepticism. 
For the nature of transcendental argument, I focus on analytic/synthetic, 
regressive/progressive, and referentiality, which refer to three core concepts 
involving in transcendental arguments: necessity, possibility and transcendental. The 
debate of Analysis / synthesis refers to our understanding of necessity, one is logical 
or deductive necessity. According to it, transcendental argument is a deductive 
argument. Another is cognitive or causal necessity, or someone suggest that we 
should replace necessity by sufficiency, then transcendental argument become an 
inductive argument. The debate of regressive/progressive refers to the understanding 















transcendental argument argues from an undisputable premise, then attains to a 
substantive knowledge about the world, therefore, it do not refer to the concept 
"possibility". However, according to weak explanation, the premise of 
transcendental argument only need to be a hypothesis, and a transcendental 
argument investigate subjective conditions, i.e. our human cognitive abilities, which 
make the hypothesis possible. Referentiality is the characteristic of transcendental 
argument, and it is the proper meaning of the concept of transcendental. It shows 
that transcendental argument relates to our thinking or understanding itself, therefore, 
transcendental argument reveals the irreplaceable form of thinking itself, which 
rooted in our mind. These three properties form a unified structure, which leads to a 
modest transcendental arguments.  
Finally, I will discuss the functions and goals of transcendental arguments, and 
heavily introduce and comment the project of a modest transcendental argument 
provided by Robert Stern. Stern argues that the adversary of transcendental 
argument is justificatory skepticism, which genuinely touch human cognitive 
achievements, or it is the only skepticism we should take seriously. Then I will 
inspect varieties of transcendental paths of refuting justificatory skepticism.  
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（transcendental）概念 早出现在哲学辞典中是 1797 年默林（G.S. Mellin）











的 16 和 17 世纪，那时“先验”概念的含义同中世纪与康德的含义都不同，而
是它介于它们之间的一个中间状态。先验概念分别以三种不同的含义出现于三
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